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Auditor Industry Specialization, Board Governance,  
and Earnings Management 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction effect of auditor 
industry specialization and board governance on earnings management.  This study 
examines whether board independence is more or less effective in constraining earnings 
management for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by non-
specialists.   
Design/methodology/approach – The U.S. data were collected from the RiskMetrics 
Directors database and the Compustat database.  Regression analysis was used to test the 
research proposition.  
Findings – It was found that earnings management is more negatively associated with 
board independence for firms audited by industry specialists than for firms audited by 
non-specialists, consistent with the notion that there is a complementary relationship 
between auditor industry specialization and board governance.  The findings suggest a 
positive interaction effect of auditor industry specialization and board governance on 
accounting quality.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature by documenting explicit 
evidence that high quality boards can be more effective through hiring industry specialist 
auditors.  This study also suggests that it may be worth investigating the interaction effect 
among different corporate governance mechanisms on accounting quality.   
Keywords  Auditor industry specialization, Board governance, Earnings management 
Research type Research paper 
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1.        Introduction 
  Industry specialist auditors have more industry-specific knowledge and expertise 
than non-specialist auditors (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004).  Prior research (e.g., Balsam et 
al., 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) finds that auditor industry specialization is 
positively associated with accounting quality, suggesting that industry specialist auditors 
can provide high quality audit services to clients.  Thus, industry specialist auditors serve 
an important role in monitoring financial reporting process. 
           Industry specialist auditors may constrain earnings management not only through 
the audit of financial statements but also through their interaction with the client’s 
internal corporate governance mechanisms including board of directors.  Auditors may 
interact with board of directors as directors are involved in resolving the conflicts 
between management and auditors (Klein, 2002).  Beasley and Petroni (2001) and 
Carcello et al. (2002) suggest that high quality boards of directors demand high quality 
auditors.  If the interaction between the board of directors and auditors is effective, high 
quality boards will benefit from hiring industry specialist auditors.  In other words, there 
may be a complement relationship between board governance and auditor industry 
specialization. 
         Contrary to the U.S. study by Carcello et al. (2002), Tsui et al. (2001) document a 
negative association between board independence and audit fees in Hong Kong, which is 
inconsistent with the complement relationship between board governance quality and 
audit quality.  Kwon et al. (2007) also find that auditor industry specialization is more 
effective in improving accounting quality measured by discretionary accruals in countries 
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with a weak legal environment than in countries with a strong legal environment.  As 
corporate governance is usually weak in a weak legal environment (DeFond and Hung, 
2004), their study suggests that auditor industry specialization may serve as a substitute 
to other corporate governance mechanisms.1  Thus, it is still unclear whether auditor 
industry specialization complements or substitutes to board governance. 
 To shed more light on the relationship between auditor industry specialization and 
board governance, this study examines whether there is a complement or substitute 
relationship between auditor industry specialization and board governance from a 
different but more explicit perspective.  Based on the framework of Klein (2002), we 
examine the interaction effect of board independence and auditor industry specialization 
on earnings management.  If auditor industry specialization can complement (substitute) 
to board governance, we expect that earnings management will be more (less) negatively 
associated with board independence for firms whose auditors have high industry 
specialization than for firms whose auditors have low industry specialization. 
           Using a sample of 18,513 firm-year observations over the period 1996 to 2010, we 
document evidence that the negative association between earnings management and 
board independence is stronger for firms with high auditor industry specialization than 
for firms with low auditor industry specialization, consistent with the notion that there is 
a complement relationship between auditor industry specialization and board governance.  
Overall, our results suggest that auditor industry specialization can improve the 
effectiveness of boards of directors in constraining earnings management. 
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           This study contributes to academics and practitioners in the following ways.  First, 
we extend a stream of research on the relationship between board governance and audit 
quality.  Unlike prior research (e.g., Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002), our 
study employs a more explicit approach to testing whether auditor industry specialization 
can complement or substitute to board governance.  Although previous studies find that 
high quality boards demand high quality auditors, there is no empirical evidence that high 
quality auditors can help high quality boards to increase the monitoring effectiveness, 
which can be regarded as the benefits of hiring industry specialist auditors.  Our study 
fills in this literature gap by documenting explicit evidence that high quality boards can 
be more effective through hiring industry specialist auditors.  Second, this study adds to 
the extant literature on the effect of corporate governance on accounting quality (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002).  Prior research focuses on the main effect of corporate 
governance on accounting quality.  Our study suggests that it may be worth investigating 
the interaction effect among different corporate governance mechanisms on accounting 
quality.  Third, this study also has a practical implication for boards of directors.  Our 
findings suggest that industry specialist auditors can help outside directors to more 
effectively oversee financial reporting process.  Therefore, it is valuable for boards of 
directors to hire industry specialist auditors. 
 
2.        Literature review 
2.1      Board governance and accounting quality 
 There is a strand of research that investigates the effect of board governance on 
accounting quality.  Beasley (1996) examines whether board composition affects the 
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likelihood of financial statement fraud.  He finds that financial statement fraud is less 
likely to occur for firms with high percentages of outside directors than for firms with 
low percentages of outside directors, suggesting that high board independence can reduce 
the occurrence of accounting fraud.  Vafeas (2000) uses earnings-returns relationship as a 
proxy for earnings quality.  He finds that earnings-returns relationship is not affected by 
the fraction of outside directors on the board.  Klein (2002) investigates the relationship 
between board and audit committee characteristics and earnings management.  She 
documents that board independence and audit committee independence are negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals.  Likewise, Xie et al. (2003) find that high board 
independence is associated with less earnings management measured by discretionary 
accruals.  Vafeas (2005) also finds that managers are less likely to manipulate earnings 
when boards and audit committees have high governance quality as measured by various 
board and audit committee characteristics.   These results suggest that high quality boards 
are more effective in constraining earnings management. 
           Again, Bedard et al. (2004) document lower earnings management for firms 
whose audit committee members possess high financial and governance expertise. 2  
Abbott et al. (2004) examine whether audit committee structures identified by the BRC 
reduce the likelihood of accounting restatement.3  They find that firms with high audit 
committee independence and activity (i.e., whether the committee meets at least four 
times per year) are less likely to experience accounting restatement.  Beekes et al. (2004) 
find that firms with high board independence more timely recognize bad news in 
earnings.  Thus, board governance can improve earnings quality. 
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2.2      Auditor industry specialization and accounting quality 
 It is argued that industry specialist auditors provide high quality audit services to 
their clients, resulting in high quality accounting information of the clients.  This is 
because industry specialist auditors gain more industry specific knowledge and have 
more industry expertise than non-specialist auditors (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004).  Balsam 
et al. (2003) examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings 
quality.  They find that auditor industry specialization is negatively associated with 
absolute discretionary accruals and is positively associated with earnings response 
coefficients.  Krishnan (2003) also finds that the level of absolute discretionary accruals 
is higher for non-specialist auditors than for specialists.  These results are consistent with 
the notion that industry specialist auditors conduct higher quality audits than non-
specialists. 
           Dunn and Mayhew (2004) examine whether auditor industry specialization affects 
clients’ disclosure quality.  They argue that a client’s selection of auditors may be part of 
its overall disclosure strategy.  They document that auditor industry specialization is 
positively associated with a client’s disclosure quality as measured by analysts’ 
disclosure quality evaluations. 4   Kwon et al. (2007) investigate the role of auditor 
industry specialization in the international context.  Using a sample from 28 countries 
over 1993 to 2003, they find that clients of industry specialist auditors have low 
discretionary accruals and high earnings response coefficients.  They also find that 
auditor industry specialization has a more positive effect on earnings quality in countries 
with a weak legal environment than in countries with a strong legal environment.  Their 
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findings suggest that auditor industry specialization may substitute to other corporate 
governance mechanisms because corporate governance is usually weaker in weak legal 
environments than in strong legal environments (La Porta et al., 1997; DeFond and Hung, 
2004). 
 
2.3      Board governance and audit quality 
 Prior research regarding the relation between board governance and audit quality 
focuses on the association between board governance and audit fees, where audit fees are 
deemed to reflect audit quality.  There are two conflicting arguments on the relationship 
between board governance quality and audit fees.  One argument is that board 
governance quality is positively associated with audit fees as high quality boards are 
more concerned with the effective oversight of management through external audit 
function.  These boards of directors may expect external auditors to expend more audit 
effort, thus increasing the audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002).  The opposite argument is 
that board governance quality is negatively associated with audit fees because there may 
be a substitute relationship between the governance mechanism of boards and the 
governance mechanism of auditors (Tsui et al., 2001). 
          Carcello et al. (2002) examine the association between board characteristics and 
audit fees for a sample of 258 U.S. firms.  They find positive relations between board 
characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and audit fees, suggesting that a 
high quality board purchases more audit work to protect its reputation capital, to avoid 
legal liability, and to promote shareholder interests.  Abbott et al. (2003) examine the 
association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees using a sample of 492 
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U.S. firms.  They find that audit fees are positively associated with certain audit 
committee characteristics including committee independence and financial expertise, 
consistent with the notion that high quality audit committees have a higher demand for 
increased audit coverage as reflected in higher audit fees.  Knechel and Willekens (2006) 
examine whether corporate governance and disclosure of risk management affect audit 
fees.  Using a sample of 50 Belgian firms, they document that audit fees are higher when 
firms have high board independence.  Overall, these studies support the argument that the 
governance mechanism of auditors may complement to the governance mechanism of 
boards. 
           Tsui et al. (2001) also investigate the association between board independence and 
audit fees based on a sample of 659 firm-year observations in Hong Kong.  In contrast to 
the above studies, they find that board independence is negatively associated with audit 
fees, and that the negative association between board independence and audit fees is 
weakened by growth opportunities.  Their findings suggest that firms with high quality 
board governance may demand less audit effort, but the decrease in audit effort is less 
evident for high growth firms because growth opportunities mitigate the effectiveness of 
board governance.  Their results are consistent with the alternative argument that the 
governance mechanism of auditors may substitute to the governance mechanism of 
boards. 
           Prior research also considers the relationship between board governance and audit 
quality that is measured by auditor specialization.  Abbott and Parker (2000) argue that 
independent and active audit committee members demand a high level of audit quality 
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because they are more concerned with reputational or monetary losses that may result 
from lawsuits or SEC sanction.  Using a sample of 500 U.S. listed companies, they 
document that firms with audit committees that consist of non-employees and meet at 
least twice per year are more likely to employ industry specialist auditors.  Beasley and 
Petroni (2001) examine whether board independence affects the choice of external 
auditors for 681 U.S. insurance companies.  They find that insurers with high board 
independence are more likely to choose a specialist brand name auditor, suggesting that 
outside directors prefer to hire specialist auditors to more closely monitor management. 
           Overall, prior research on the relationship between board governance and audit 
quality suggests that high quality boards have a demand for high audit quality at least in 
some countries such as U.S.  It is argued that directors on these boards use high quality 
auditors to effectively oversee management.  However, there is limited research in the 
literature that provides explicit evidence on the benefits of hiring specialist auditors for 
high quality boards. 
 
3.        Research proposition 
 Prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003) finds that high board 
independence leads to less earnings management, suggesting that outside directors on the 
board serve an important role in monitoring financial reporting process.  While outside 
directors have incentives to protect reputational capitals and reduce litigation risks by 
hindering accounting fraud (Carcello et al., 2002), they do not directly audit financial 
statements.  Adams et al. (2010) argue that it is difficult for boards of directors to directly 
 9 
detect managerial malfeasance.  Boards of directors may indirectly protect against 
managerial malfeasance through their choice of auditors.    
 A complementary relationship between auditor industry specialization and board 
governance may arise from the interaction between outside directors and external 
auditors. Outside directors, especially those sitting on the audit committee, have 
opportunities to regularly meet with external auditors to review the company’s financial 
statements, audit process, and internal control systems.  During these meetings, auditors 
can provide advice to outside directors on the effective oversight of financial reporting 
process.  Outside directors may be alerted of potential accounting problems when they 
intervene in the resolution of disputes between managers and auditors (Klein, 2002).  
Thus, external auditing can strengthen the role of outside directors in monitoring 
management, suggesting that external auditing may complement to board governance.  
           The effectiveness of the interaction between outside directors and auditors will 
largely depend on the quality of auditors.  Industry specialist auditors have high industry 
specific knowledge and can provide high quality audit services (Balsam et al., 2003; 
Krishnan, 2003).  Industry specialist auditors are more likely to see through earnings 
management and detect accounting misstatements or frauds.  When industry specialist 
auditors identify an accounting issue and struggle with management to adjust accounting 
numbers, the board will play a decisive role.   Boards with high governance quality are 
more likely to adopt the auditor’s opinion on the issue, which facilitates the boards to see 
through earnings management.  Thus, high auditor industry specialization may 
complement to high quality boards in monitoring financial reporting process.  Based on 
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the above discussion, we conjecture that there could be a complement relationship 
between auditor industry specialization and board governance.   
           It is also possible for a substitute relationship between auditor industry 
specialization and board governance although we conjecture a complement relationship 
between them.  We are concerned with this competing conjecture because Tsui et al. 
(2001) and Kwon et al. (2007) suggest that auditor industry specialization may substitute 
to corporate governance.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams et al. (2010) 
contend that board composition is endogenously determined, suggesting that the 
monitoring effectiveness of outside directors is affected by economic factors.  The 
demand for board effectiveness may decrease when the quality of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms is high.  Thus, whether there is a complement or substitute 
relationship between auditor industry specialization and board governance could be an 
empirical question.   
Based on prior research into the relationship between earnings management and 
board governance quality (e.g., Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003), we investigate the effect of 
auditor industry specialization on the effectiveness of board governance in constraining 
earnings management.  Specifically, we conjecture a more (less) negative association 
between earnings management and board governance quality for firms audited by 
industry specialists if auditor industry specialization complements (substitutes) to board 
governance quality.  Since this is an empirical question, we develop the research 
proposition as follows: 
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 Research Proposition: The association between earnings management and board 
governance quality is different for firms audited by industry specialist auditors and firms 
audited by non-specialist auditors. 
 
4.        Data, variables, and models 
 We start with selecting sample firms from the latest version of RiskMetrics 
Directors database, which provides information about the composition of board of 
directors for around 1,500 largest companies during the years 1996 to 2010.  The 
RiskMetrics Directors database defines an independent director as a director who is 
neither affiliated nor currently an employee of the company.5  The RiskMetrics dataset 
consists of 221,144 firm-year-director observations, which are used to determine board 
independence for 23,239 firm-year observations.  We then collect financial statement 
data from the Compustat database for the same sample period to compute other variables 
used in the analyses.  After merging the RiskMetrics dataset with the Compustat dataset, 
we obtain the final sample consisting of 18,513 firm-year observations for the years 1996 
to 2010.  Table 1 presents the breakdown of the sample by year. 
Insert Table 1 
           Like prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), we use 
discretionary accruals to measure earnings management.  We adopt Kothari et al. (2005) 
and compute discretionary accruals as follows.  First, we estimate the cross-sectional 
variant of the Jones (1991) model within each two-digit SIC industry-year: 
                ACC/TA
-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES/TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + ε                        (1) 
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In equation (1), ACC is total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flow from operations. TA
-1 is 
total assets at the beginning of the year. ∆SALES is change in sales between year t-1 and 
year t.  PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. 
           Like Klein (2002), we use all firm-year observations on the Compustat to estimate 
the parameters in equation (1) for each two-digit SIC industry-year that has at least eight 
firms.  Discretionary accruals for the sample observations are measured as the residual 
values from equation (1).  Next, we match each firm-year observation in the sample to a 
firm-year observation from the population by the same two-digit SIC industry-year and 
the closest return on assets (ROA) to control for the effect of firm performance on the 
estimate of discretionary accruals.  We then compute the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals for each sample observation by subtracting the discretionary 
accruals of the matched observation from the discretionary accruals of the observation.  
Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that the performance-matched discretionary accruals based 
on the above procedures are less misspecified than other measures of discretionary 
accruals.  Finally, we use the absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals (ADAC) as a measure of earnings management.  Similar to prior research (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), we take the absolute value for the measurement 
because managers manipulate earnings not only upward but also downward (Levitt, 
1998). 
           Prior research (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003) on boards of 
directors usually uses board independence, i.e., the proportion of independent directors 
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on the board, to measure board governance quality as independent directors are regarded 
as effective monitors of the management.  These studies document a positive association 
between board independence and financial reporting quality, suggesting that board 
independence positively affects the effectiveness of financial reporting process.  Thus, we 
use board independence (BDIND) as a major measure of board governance quality in our 
study.       
           We consider audit firms as specialist auditors in a specific industry where they 
have devoted the most resources to develop industry-specific knowledge.  Since clients’ 
size reflects auditors’ efforts on the clients, we use portfolio shares for industries, i.e., the 
ratio of the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients of an auditor in a 
specific industry to the total sum of the square root of the total assets of all clients of the 
auditor (Behn et al., 2008), to measure auditor industry specialization (AISPE).  A large 
portfolio share indicates large investments by audit firms in developing industry audit 
technologies.   
          We also use several control variables in the analyses because they may affect 
earnings management or board governance quality.  Firm size (FSIZE) is measured as the 
natural logarithm of market value of common equity.  We include FSIZE as large firms 
have high political costs and thus are more likely to manage earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  On the other hand, Boone et al. (2007) find that board independence 
is positively associated with firm size.  Financial leverage (LEV) is measured by the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets.  LEV is added in regression models because Dechow et 
al. (1996) and Klein (2002) find that this variable is positively associated with earnings 
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management.  Nevertheless, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that financial leverage 
can reduce agency costs, suggesting that LEV may affect the demand for board 
governance quality.6  Market-to-book ratio (MB) is measured by the ratio of the market 
value of common equity to the book value of common equity.  We include MB in 
regression models because Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest that firms with high growth 
opportunities, identified by high market-to-book ratio, are more likely to engage in 
earnings management.  Other studies, such as Bathala and Rao (1995) and Linck et al. 
(2008), also find that board governance quality is negatively associated with growth 
opportunities.   
           In addition, implicit claim (ICLAIM) is measured as one minus the ratio of gross 
plant, property, and equipment to total assets.  As Bowen et al. (1995) indicate that 
implicit claims may positively affect earnings management, we control for implicit 
claims in the regressions. Net operating assets (NOA) are measured as shareholders’ 
equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total liability at the end of fiscal year t-
1, scaled by sales of fiscal year t-1.  Litigation risk (LITI) is coded “1” if the firm belongs 
to one of the following industries: pharmaceutical / biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836, 
8731-8734), computer (3570-3577, 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-
5961), and “0” otherwise.  Based on Cheng and Warfield (2005), firms with high net 
operating assets or high litigation risks are less likely to manage earnings.  Thus, we 
include NOA and LITI in the model.  Loss dummy (LOSS) is a dummy coded “1” if net 
income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and “0” otherwise.   We add LOSS 
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because Francis et al. (2004) find that accrual quality is lower for firms that incur losses, 
suggesting that those firms may have higher earnings management.   
           Before testing the interaction effects of board independence and auditor industry 
specialization, we examine their main effects on earnings management based on the 
following regression model:7 
 ADAC = β0 + β1BDIND + β2AISPE + β3FSIZE + β4LEV + β5MB + β6ICLAIM + β7NOA  
             + β8LITI + β9LOSS + ε                                                                           (2) 
For all tests, we estimate regression models with standard errors that cluster by year, 
which can mitigate the effect of autocorrelation of time series data.  In equation (2), 
BDIND and AISPE are standardized by (BDIND – mean (0.64))/std (0.18) and (AISPE – 
mean (0.04))/std (0.04), respectively.  As prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002; Balsam et al., 
2003) finds that board independence and auditor industry specialization are negatively 
associated with earnings management, we expect a negative coefficient on both BDIND 
and AISPE.  
           To examine our research proposition, we expand equation (2) by including the 
interaction term of board independence and auditor industry specialization as follows: 
ADAC = β0 + β1BDIND + β2AISPE + β3BDIND * AISPE+ β4FSIZE + β5LEV + β6MB  
            + β7ICLAIM + β8NOA + β9LITI + β10LOSS + ε                                           (3) 
In equation (3), we expect the coefficient on BDIND*AISPE to be negative (positive) if 
board independence and auditor industry specialization have a complement (substitute) 
relationship on enhancing earnings quality.  Based on the literature, we also expect that 
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the coefficients on MB, ICLAIM, and LOSS are positive, and that the coefficients on NOA 
and LITI are negative.8 
 
5.        Empirical results 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for the full sample.  The 
mean and median of the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals 
are 0.09 and 0.06, respectively.  The mean and median of board independence are 0.64 
and 0.67, respectively, which indicate that approximate 64 to 67% of directors on the 
board are independent directors during our sample period.  The mean and median of 
auditor industry specialization are 0.04 and 0.03, respectively, which are close to those 
reported in Behn et al. (2008) (i.e., mean = 0.042, median = 0.037).  Table 2 also 
compares the descriptive statistics between firms with high AISPE and firms with low 
AISPE, where high (low) AISPE means that a firm’s AISPE is not less than (less than) the 
median of AISPE for a given year. 
Insert Table 2 
           Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the independent variables.  
We find that board independence and auditor industry specialization are negatively 
associated with absolute discretionary accruals (r = -0.06, p < .01; -0.03, p < .01, 
respectively).  These correlations provide univariate evidence that board independence 
and auditor industry specialization negatively affect earnings management.  We also find 
that auditor industry specialization is positively correlated with board independence (r = 
0.08, p < .01), consistent with the notion that high quality boards have a high demand for 
high quality audits (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001).  The maximum 
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absolute value of those correlation coefficients is 0.37 for the correlation between AISPE 
and NOA.  Since the correlations are not excessively high, multicollinearity is not a 
substantive issue in this study. 
Insert Table 3 
           Table 4 reports the main results on the effects of board independence and auditor 
industry specialization on earnings management.  The results in columns 3 and 4 show 
that the coefficient on board independence is negative and significant (t = -3.59, p <.01), 
consistent with Klein (2002), while the coefficient on auditor industry specialization is 
insignificant, inconsistent with Balsam et al. (2003).  The results in columns 5 and 6 
indicate a negative and significant coefficient (t = -4.15, p <.01) on the interaction of 
board independence and auditor industry specialization. The results suggest that auditor 
industry specialization could be a complement rather than substitute to board 
independence in improving accounting quality.  Thus, high quality boards are more 
effective in constraining earnings management when they hire industry specialist 
auditors.   
Insert Table 4 
           To test the robustness of our results, we conduct several additional analyses as 
follows.  First, we use signed discretionary accruals in place of absolute discretionary 
accruals to measure earnings management.  We estimate equations (2) and (3) for 
positive or negative discretionary accruals separately.  We expect that the coefficient on 
BDIND*AISPE is significantly negative for positive discretionary accruals, and is 
 18 
significantly positive for negative discretionary accruals if the interaction of board 
independence and auditor industry specialization can enhance earnings quality.  
           Table 5 provides the results on signed discretionary accruals.  We find that the 
coefficient on the interaction of board independence and auditor industry specialization is 
negative and significant for positive discretionary accruals (t = -5.64, p < .01), and is 
positive and significant for negative discretionary accruals (t = 3.17, p < .01).  These 
results are consistent with the complement argument, suggesting that auditor industry 
specialization enhances the effectiveness of board governance in reducing both income-
increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals.  Thus, our results still hold 
when we use signed discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. 
Insert Table 5 
           Second, we use the market share measure as an alternative measure of auditor 
industry specialization, which is computed as the ratio of the sum of the sales of the 
clients of an auditor in a two-digit SIC industry to the total sum of the sales of all 
companies in that industry.  Table 6 reports the results on the market share measure.  We 
still find a negative coefficient on BDIND*AISPE for absolute discretionary accruals 
although this coefficient is not statistically significant.  We also find that the coefficient 
on BDIND*AISPE for positive discretionary accruals is negative and significant at the 
one-tailed test (t = -1.61, p < .10), consistent with the complement argument.  Overall, the 
results based on the market share measure of auditor industry specialization are inclined 
to support the complement argument rather than the substitute argument. 
Insert Table 6 
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           Third, we test the research proposition by allowing for the endogeneity of board 
independence.  We are concerned with this issue because prior research (e.g., Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998; Boone et al., 2007) suggests that board composition is 
endogenously determined.  We employ a two-stage regression to deal with this issue.  
The first-stage regression is to regress board independence on exogenous variables and an 
instrumental variable.  We use two ways to choose the instrumental variable.  Following 
Frankel et al. (2006), we rank observations by board governance quality and then 
categorize them into three equal-sized portfolios.  The first instrument is the portfolio 
rank of board independence measured by “0”, “1” or “2” for observations in the lowest, 
middle, or highest portfolio, respectively. 9   We also use the lagged value of board 
independence as the second instrument in that it is an alternative econometric approach to 
dealing with endogeneity (Fisher, 1965).  We estimate the first-stage equation as follows: 
          BDIND = α0 + α1MB +α2LEV +α3FSIZE + α4INSTR + ε                              (4) 
In equation (4), the instrumental variable (INSTR) is measured by (a) the portfolio rank of 
BDIND coded “0”, “1”, and “2” for observations in the lowest, middle, and highest 
portfolio, respectively, or (b) the lagged value of BDIND.  We include MB, LEV, and 
FSIZE in equation (4) as exogenous variables because these firm characteristics may 
affect board independence.10  We run the second-stage regression by replacing BDIND in 
equation (3) with the fitted value of BDIND from equation (4). 
           Table 7 presents the results on the two-stage regression.  Panels A and B of Table 
7 contain the results of the first-stage and second-stage regressions, respectively.  
Columns 3 and 4 report the results when the portfolio rank of board independence is used 
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as the instrumental variable.  We document a negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between board independence and auditor industry specialization (t = -
3.19, p < .01).  When the lagged value of board independence is used as the instrumental 
variable in columns 5 and 6, we also find that the coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative and significant (t = -4.30, p < .01).  Thus, we find the results supporting the 
complement argument even when allowing for the endogeneity of board governance 
quality. 
Insert Table 7 
           Fourth, we test the robustness of our results to using the likelihood of small 
positive earnings as an alternative measure of earnings management.  We identify 
earnings as small positive earnings if earnings deflated by total assets are between 0 and 
0.02.  We replace ADAC in equation (3) with a dummy coded “1” for firms with small 
positive earnings and “0” otherwise and run the logistic regression.  We document a 
negative and significant coefficient on BDIND*AISPE (non-tabulated χ2 = 1.93, p < .10).  
These results are consistent with the results based on discretionary accruals. 
           Fifth, we examine the research proposition by using alternative measures of board 
governance quality.  When we use audit committee independence to replace board 
independence in equation (3) for 1996 to 2002,11  we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction of audit committee independence and auditor industry 
specialization (non-tabulated t = -1.99, p < .10), consistent with the results on board 
independence.  By estimating equation (3) based on the proportion of financial experts on 
the board (i.e. board financial expertise) for 2007 to 2010,12 we find an insignificant 
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coefficient on the interaction of board financial expertise and auditor industry 
specialization.  A possible explanation for the results on board financial expertise is that 
directors with financial expertise may not need complement of financial expertise from 
auditors.  When we estimate equation (2) using the proportion of directors who attend not 
less than 75% of board meetings,13 which reflects active board involvement, we also find 
an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of active board involvement and auditor 
industry specialization.  A possible explanation for the results on active board 
involvement is that directors with less attendance, who may be less familiar with the 
company, may have a higher demand for expertise from auditors to monitor managers, 
which may offset the interaction effect of active board involvement and auditor industry 
specialization.  
           Sixth, we examine whether the results are driven by firm performance or firm size.  
We consider this issue because firms with sound board governance or firms audited by 
industry specialist auditors may have higher firm performance or larger size.  We split the 
sample into two groups based on ROA or firm size, i.e., high vs. low ROA groups, and 
large vs. small firm groups, and estimate equation (3) for each group.  We find that the 
coefficient on BDIND*AISPE is all significantly negative for high ROA group, low ROA 
group, large firm group, and small firm group (non-tabulated t = -1.51, p < .10 one-tailed 
test; t = -4.21, p < .01; t = -4.06, p < .01; t = -2.56, p < .05).  Thus, our results are less 
likely to be driven by firm performance or firm size. 
           Finally, we estimate equation (3) using accruals data at year t and board 
independence and auditor industry specialization data at year t-1 to examine whether the 
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interaction of board independence and auditor industry specialization is the causation of 
lower earnings management.  We also find a negative and significant coefficient on 
BDIND*AISPE (non-tabulated t = -4.15, p < .01).  This suggests that lower earnings 
management is caused by the interaction of board independence and auditor industry 
specialization. 
 
6.        Conclusions 
  This paper examines whether auditor industry specialization enhances the 
effectiveness of board governance in constraining earnings management.  We argue that 
earnings management is more (less) negatively associated with board independence for 
firms with high auditor industry specialization than for firms with low auditor industry 
specialization if there is a complement (substitute) relationship between auditor industry 
specialization and board governance.  Using a sample of 18,513 firm-year observations 
from 1996 to 2010, we document evidence on the positive effect of auditor industry 
specialization on the effectiveness of board independence.  The results are consistent with 
the notion that auditor industry specialization complements to board governance.  
Overall, our findings suggest that high quality boards are more effective in constraining 
earnings management when they hire industry specialist auditors. 
           This study makes the following contributions and implications to academics and 
practitioners.  First, we add to the extant research into the relationship between audit 
quality and board governance by examining whether auditor industry specialization 
complements or substitutes to board governance.  Unlike prior research (e.g., Beasley and 
Petroni, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002), this study provides more explicit evidence that high 
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quality boards can benefit from industry specialist auditors.  Second, this study suggests 
that in addition to the main effects examined in prior research, it may be worth examining 
the interaction effects among different corporate governance mechanisms on accounting 
quality.  Third, this study also provides a practical implication that it is valuable for 
boards of directors to hire industry specialist auditors. 
          We note that our results should be cautiously interpreted because of the following 
limitations of this study.  First, the endogeneity of board governance is still a concern of 
our analyses while we allow for this issue by running the two stage regression.  Like 
other corporate governance studies, it is difficult for our study to find the most 
appropriate instrumental variable.  Future research may employ more refined approaches 
to dealing with this issue.  Second, the large dataset in this study constrains the possibility 
of considering more aspects of board governance, which may reduce the generalizability 
of our findings.  Future research may explore more alternative measures of board 
governance.  Third, there are data constraints to measure city-specific auditor industry 
specialization in this study.  Future research may examine whether our results can hold 
for city-specific auditor industry specialization.  
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Table 1 
Sample breakdown by year 
   
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
1996 1,155 6.24 
1997 1,290 6.97 
1998 1,416 7.65 
1999 1,407 7.60 
2000 1,414 7.64 
2001 1,471 7.95 
2002 1,190 6.43 
2003 1,198 6.47 
2004 1,198 6.47 
2005 1,189 6.42 
2006 1,146 6.19 
2007 1,014 5.48 
2008 1,072 5.79 
2009 1,211 6.54 
2010 1,142 6.17 
Total 18,513 100.00 
   
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Full Sample     High AISPE                Low AISPE              High vs. Low AISPE  
  (N =18,513)  (N =9,339) (N=9,174)   
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std t-statistic z-statistic 
ADAC 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.09 10.47***   6.21*** 
BDIND 0.67 0.71 0.18 0.69 0.71 0.18 0.66 0.69 0.18 9.89*** 10.51*** 
AISPE 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01      135.48***       117.47*** 
FSIZE 7.40 7.31 1.49 7.59 7.50 1.51 7.20 7.13 1.44 17.82*** 16.92*** 
LEV 0,19 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.16 -5.45*** -6.98*** 
MB 3.03 2.18 3.19 3.19 2.24 3.39 2.86 2.13 2.96 7.00*** 8.37*** 
ICLAIM  0.46 0.54 0.38 0.49 0.60 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.36 10.83*** 15.24*** 
NOA 1.25 0.89 1.13 1.54 1.06 1.32 0.96 0.77 0.79 36.15*** 38.43*** 
LITI 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.20 0.00 0.40 26.92*** 26.37*** 
LOSS 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.24 10.17*** 10.12*** 
       
    
 
ADAC is the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the Jones model. 
BDIND is board independence, measured by the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
AISPE is auditor industry specialization, measured by the ratio of the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients of an auditor in a specific industry to the total sum of the  
square root of the total assets of all clients of the auditor. 
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of the common equity. 
LEV is leverage, measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
MB is market-to-book value, measured by the ratio of the market value of the common equity to the book value of the common equity. 
ICLAIM is implicit claim, measured by one minus the ratio of gross plant, property, and equipment to total assets.  
NOA is net operating assets, measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash and marketable securities plus total liability at the end of fiscal year t-1, scaled by sales of fiscal year t-1. 
LITI is litigation risk, coded “1” if the firm belongs to one of the following industries: pharmaceutical / biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577,  
7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-5961), and “0” otherwise. 
LOSS is a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and 0 otherwise.  
*** p <  .01 (two-tailed). 
  
Table 3 
Pearson correlations 
       
      
    
  
Variable BDIND AISPE FSIZE LEV MB ICLAIM NOA LITI LOSS 
ADAC -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.08***  0.09***  0.15*** -0.06***   0.13***   0.11*** 
BDIND   0.08***  0.17*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.07***  0.01 -0.05*** -0.06*** 
AISPE    0.12***  0.08*** -0.03*** -0.07***  0.37*** -0.01*   0.02** 
FSIZE    -0.01*  0.35***   0.01*  0.12***   0.03***  -0.22*** 
LEV     -0.08*** -0.28***  0.24*** -0.24***   0.08*** 
MB       0.10*** -0.12***   0.12*** -0.07*** 
ICLAIM       -0.06***   0.17***   0.02*** 
NOA        -0.18***   0.10*** 
LITI                   0.10*** 
    
   
   
 
All variables are defined in Table 2. 
*** p <  .01 (two-tailed).  ** p <  .05 (two-tailed). * p <  .10 (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Main results 
  
  
  
  Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.097 23.72*** 0.099 23.61*** 
BDIND - -0.003 -3.59*** -0.003 -3.99*** 
AISPE - 0.001 0.52 0.002 1.14 
BDIND*AISPE +/-   -0.004 -4.15*** 
FSIZE - -0.004 -8.11*** -0.004 -8.19*** 
LEV +/- -0.013 -2.03* -0.013 -2.01* 
MB + 0.003 11.16*** 0.003 11.08*** 
ICLAIM  + 0.031 9.26*** 0.030 9.40*** 
NOA - -0.003 -3.01*** -0.003 -3.21*** 
LITI - 0.016 5.17*** 0.016 5.08*** 
LOSS + 0.036 9.08*** 0.034 8.74*** 
      
N   18,513    18,513 
F-statistic   44.73***   58.77*** 
R2   5.61%  5.73% 
  
  
  
The regression models are as follows: 
ADAC = β0 + β1BDIND + β2AISPE + β3FSIZE + β4LEV + β5MB + β6ICLAIM + β7NOA + β8LITI + β9LOSS  
              + ε                                                                           (2) 
ADAC = β0 + β1BDIND + β2AISPE + β3BDIND * AISPE+ β4FSIZE + β5LEV + β6MB + β7ICLAIM + β8NOA  
             + β9LITI + β10LOSS + ε                                           (3) 
All variables are defined in Table 2. 
*** p < .01 (two-tailed).  * p <  .10 (two-tailed).   
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Table 5 
Results on signed discretionary accruals 
 
Panel A. Positive discretionary accruals 
  
  
  Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.096 16.33*** 0.098 16.66*** 
BDIND - -0.001 -1.20 -0.002 -1.37 
AISPE - -0.000 -0.31 0.001 0.44 
BDIND*AISPE +/-   -0.004 -5.64*** 
FSIZE +/- -0.004 -6.57*** -0.004 -6.74*** 
LEV +/- -0.001 -0.15 -0.002 -0.21 
MB + 0.002 7.52*** 0.002 7.02*** 
ICLAIM  + 0.010 2.27** 0.009 2.08* 
NOA - -0.002 -2.65** -0.002 -2.73** 
LITI - 0.005 1.71 0.005 1.67 
LOSS + 0.030 6.86*** 0.028 6.54*** 
      
N   8,134  8,134 
F-statistic   38.59***   33.25*** 
R2   3.45%  3.67% 
  
Panel B. Negative discretionary accruals 
  
  
  Equation (2) Equation (3) 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- -0.103 -16.44*** -0.105 -15.93*** 
BDIND + 0.004 3.97*** 0.005 4.42*** 
AISPE + -0.001 -0.68 -0.002 -1.28 
BDIND*AISPE +/-   0.004 3.17*** 
FSIZE +/- 0.004 5.39*** 0.004 5.39*** 
LEV +/- 0.023 2.92** 0.023 2.90** 
MB - -0.004 -8.13*** -0.004 -8.03*** 
ICLAIM  - -0.041 -10.94*** -0.040 -11.15*** 
NOA + 0.004 3.52*** 0.005 3.70*** 
LITI + -0.021 -5.99*** -0.021 -5.87*** 
LOSS - -0.032 -7.36*** -0.031 -7.09*** 
      
N   10,379  10,379 
F-statistic   51.64***   77.41*** 
R2   7.40%  7.51% 
  
  
  
All variables are defined in Table 2. 
** p <  .05 (two-tailed).  *** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
  
Table 6 
Results on market share measure  
                    
 Absolute discretionary accruals Positive discretionary accruals Negative discretionary accruals 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.095 21.82*** +/- 0.095 16.81*** +/- -0.100 -16.27*** 
BDIND - -0.003 -3.76*** - -0.001 -1.21 + 0.004 4.00*** 
AISPE - -0.002 -3.72*** - -0.001 -1.50 + 0.002 3.18*** 
BDIND*AISPE +/- -0.000 -0.59 +/- -0.001 -1.61 +/- -0.000 -0.51 
FSIZE +/- -0.004 -6.74*** +/- -0.004 -6.46*** +/- 0.004 4.88*** 
LEV +/- -0.013 -1.98* +/- -0.001 -0.15 +/- 0.022 2.87** 
MB + 0.003 10.65*** + 0.002 7.40*** - -0.004 -7.92*** 
ICLAIM  + 0.030 9.12*** + 0.009 2.12* - -0.040 -11.05*** 
NOA - -0.003 -2.42** - -0.002 -2.42** + 0.004 3.08*** 
LITI - 0.016 5.00*** - 0.005 1.60 + -0.021 -5.89*** 
LOSS + 0.036 9.08*** + 0.030 6.89*** - -0.032 -7.35*** 
          
N   18,513   8,134   10,379 
        
F-statistic   73.26***   37.54***   53.05*** 
R2      5.65%      3.52%      7.45% 
          
All variables are defined in Table 2. 
* p <  .10 (two-tailed). 
** p <  .05 (two-tailed). 
*** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
  
Table 7 
Results on two-stage regression 
 
Panel A. First-stage regression     
  Portfolio rank Lagged value 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- -1.182 -65.57*** -0.072 -3.41*** 
MB - -0.003 -2.86*** -0.005 -4.02*** 
LEV - -0.164  -7.87*** 0.011 0.44 
FSIZE + 0.024 9.50*** 0.025 8.80*** 
INSTR + 1.068 251.88*** 0.822 204.22*** 
      
N   18,513  15,748 
F-statistic   16,561.00***  10,870.40*** 
R2    78.16%  74.41% 
  
  
  
Panel B. Second-stage regression     
  Portfolio rank Lagged value 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.099 23.62*** 0.097 19.86*** 
BDIND - -0.003 -3.78*** -0.003 -2.12* 
AISPE - 0.002 1.03 0.002 1.53 
BDIND*AISPE +/- -0.004 -3.19*** -0.006 -4.30*** 
FSIZE +/- -0.004 -8.50*** -0.004 -6.84*** 
LEV +/- -0.013 -1.95* -0.008 -1.23 
MB + 0.003 11.09*** 0.003 8.64*** 
ICLAIM + 0.030 9.31*** 0.029 8.48*** 
NOA - -0.003 -3.15*** -0.003 -3.01** 
LITI - 0.016 5.11*** 0.015 5.19*** 
LOSS + 0.035 8.88*** 0.029 8.35*** 
      
N   18,513  15,748 
F-statistic   74.27***  219.31*** 
R2   5.68%  4.90% 
  
  
  
The first-stage regression model is as follows: 
BRDGQ = α0 + α1MB +α2LEV +α3FSIZE + α4INSTR + ε                                                              (5) 
INSTR is the instrumental variable, measured by (a) the portfolio rank of BRDGQ coded 0, 1, and 2 for observations 
in the lowest, middle, and highest portfolio, respectively, or (b) the lagged value of BRDGQ.  BRDGQ in equation 
(3) is replaced with the fitted value of BRDGQ from equation (5).  All other variables are defined in Table 2. 
* p <  .10 (two-tailed). 
** p <  .05 (two-tailed). 
*** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Notes: 
                                                 
1
       We acknowledge that legal environment is different from corporate governance in many aspects. 
2
    Financial expertise is coded “1” if at least one audit committee member has financial expertise and “0 “ 
otherwise.  Governance expertise is measured by the average number of other board seats held by outside directors 
on the audit committee. 
3
    BRC is abbreviated from the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committee.  The purpose of BRC is to strengthen the role of audit committee in overseeing the financial reporting 
process (Abbott et al., 2004).  
4
      The analysts’ disclosure quality evaluations are provided in the annual Association for Investment Management 
Research (AIMR) Corporate Information Committee Reports. 
5
       This definition of independent director is similar to that of the U.S. exchanges.  
6
        Specifically, there might be a substitute relationship between financial leverage and board  governance quality. 
7
       All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
8
      The coefficients on LEV and FSIZE could be either positive or negative because LEV and FSIZE may positively 
or negatively affect accounting quality and corporate governance. 
9
      The portfolio rank of an endogenous variable can be used as an instrument because it captures the level of the 
variable but not the endogenously determined variations around those levels, it can be used (Hentschel and Kothari, 
2001).   
10 
       We have discussed these variables in the section entitled “Data, variables, and models”. 
11
      Since all audit committee members are required to be independent directors after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
signed into law in 2002, we use the period of 1996 to 2002 for this analysis. 
12
       The RiskMetrics Directors database provides data on financial expertise of directors only for years after 2006. 
13
    The RiskMetrics Directors database provides data on whether a director attends less than 75% of board 
meetings. 
